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Luca Ciabarri  
 
Productivity of refugee camps: social and political  
dynamics from the Somaliland-Ethiopia border  
(1988–2001)1 
 
Summary 
 
Refugee camps are not simply places where temporary protection and 
primary assistance are provided, but also places in which political and so-
cial production occurs. In areas such as the Horn of Africa, with a long 
tradition of international interventions in the form of humanitarian aid, 
refugee camps have been intrinsically embedded within local social and 
political power structures and dynamics, which have deeply transformed 
both their aims and actions. The purpose of this article is to analyse such 
transformations as part of a local social history, in particular under the pe-
culiar condition of state collapse which characterised Somaliland in the 
early 1990s. Furthermore, I wish to show how – in the course of interlaced 
institutional collapse, war and international interventions – new equilib-
riums and forms of government have emerged, thus contributing to the 
depiction of a kind of genealogy of the new public realm in Somaliland, 
composed of various actors standing beside the state. 
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ike many areas in the Horn of Africa, the north-western region of Soma-
liland2 is a place with a long tradition of international interventions in 
the form of humanitarian aid.  
                                                 
1  The writing of this article has followed a long trajectory: earlier versions were presented 
and discussed at the 2004 Aegis summer school in Cortona, Italy; at the 2005 Aegis London 
conference (panel ‘Governance beyond the State: legitimate authority in major cities and 
refugee camps’ directed by A. Mehler); and at Bayreuth University, 2005 Ethnologisches 
Kolloquium. I am grateful to all the participants in such meetings for their precious com-
ments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Mr. Ray Ball as well as two anonymous 
referees for their initial help. Fieldwork in Somaliland was conducted in 2003 during my 
PhD research, funded by Milano-Bicocca University, Italy, and again in 2005. 
2  Somaliland is a new state – though one without international recognition – which origi-
nated from the collapse of the ex-Somali state in 1991. What I have here called the north-
western region includes the Awdal and Hargeisa regions, previously part of the Somalia 
Republic and now part of Somaliland. On political developments see Ciabarri, forthcoming.  
L 
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Over the last 30 years, the area has experienced a series of political and 
social upheavals, one after the other, resulting in the continual displacement of 
the civil population. These upheavals include the severe drought of 1974/75 
and the 1977/78 Ogaden war as well as later civil strife, which started in the 
north in 1988 but had been preceded by ongoing tension throughout the 1980s.  
Alongside the conflicts and population movements, the relief interven-
tions accompanying these events, and continuing long after each individual 
emergency diminished, themselves became factors which shaped the social 
landscape of the region and indeed became part of it. 
Humanitarian interventions have become intrinsically embedded with-
in local social and political power structures and dynamics, which have 
deeply transformed both the aims and actions of these interventions. 
The recent history of northern Somalia has been closely connected with 
and influenced by the presence of refugee camps in the region. As reported 
by many scholars in various African contexts,3 refugee camps are not simply 
places where temporary protection and primary assistance are provided, but 
are also places in which political and social production occurs. As far as 
northern Somalia is concerned, this has entailed, for instance, the strengthen-
ing of new political and military movements, the emergence of new social 
identities and authorities, and the renewal of connections with the original 
refugees’ areas, leading to the formation of local accumulation processes and 
new local orders.  
In this article I will focus on this kind of social and political production 
by considering the series of camps established along the Somaliland-Ethiopia 
border from 1988 to 2001. My purpose is to emphasise the manifold relation-
ships – corresponding to a sort of ‘unintended productivity’4 and amidst a 
general situation of war and social suffering – which developed between the 
refugee camps and the surrounding social context.  
 
 
Humanitarian aid embedded: the production of local histories 
 
Ten years after the placement of camps within Somalia that originated from 
the 1977/78 Ethiopia-Somalia war, which sheltered Somali-ethnic Ethiopians, 
new camps were established in Ethiopia from 1988 onwards, just across the 
border from Somalia. These were to host the Somali population fleeing the 
civil strife which had erupted in the northern region between the local oppo-
sition movement (SNM – Somali National Movement) and the central gov-
                                                 
3  See Allen/Morsink 1994 and Allen 1996; Bascom 1998, Hammond 2004, Malkki 1995. 
4  In using the term ‘productivity’, I’m following studies such as ‘Anthropology in the Mar-
gins of the State’, cf. Das & Poole, 2004, in particular the contribution of J. Roitman. 
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ernment.5 The camps became one of the reference points for the reorganisa-
tion of the rebellion after the government’s counteroffensive, thus leading to 
the development of new institutions. Afterwards, in correspondence with the 
central state collapse in 1991, such Ethiopian camps witnessed the develop-
ment of social and economic networks which, drawing on international aid 
assistance, significantly contributed to the economic rehabilitation and political 
stabilisation of the whole northern region.6 The experience of massive dis-
placement and regrouping into camps had set in motion a dynamic process of 
societal transformation, with far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, on the 
political level, the camps played a part in promoting the material construction 
and consolidation of the new Somaliland state and its de facto recognition as a 
political subject vis-à-vis international actors. 
As such, these dynamics appear to be an example of transboundary 
politics, with refugee camps representing transboundary formations (Callaghy 
et al. 2001) that have strongly contributed to the creation of a new social and 
political landscape in post-conflict northern Somalia. Such politics, beyond 
the state and born in the refugee camps in a time of institutional collapse, 
drew on the advantage of the safety provided by crossing the border and on 
the resources distributed by international relief organisations. 
However, it was only after a transformation brought about by local actors 
that these resources became effective on the ground. Thus, this article describes 
such transformations. The appropriation of aid – what I have called the ’local 
consumption of humanitarian aid’ – is in fact the pivotal element in compre-
hending the kinds of effects that refugee camps have had on local history. The 
social homogeneity which characterises both sides of the border – in Ethiopia 
and Somalia – and constitutes what has been called a unique ‘frontier-area’ 
(Djama 1995) was the crucial factor permitting such transboundary politics. 
Location (border areas), history (the stratifications of relief interventions 
shaping a sort of ‘humanitarian memory’), and the immediate situation (civil 
strife, then state collapse) constitute the conditions for the local embedding of 
humanitarian aid. By focusing on this embedding and by considering the 
long-term stratification of relief in the area, I set out a twofold purpose:  
1) to analyse the contributions of external interventions to local dynamics 
as well as their transformation and localisation. Humanitarian aid and 
refugee camps appear here as a constitutive factor in local processes and 
are part of the local social and political history (Ranger 1994); 
                                                 
5  For a general overview see Lewis 2002. 
6  In 1991 there were nine camps in north-east Ethiopia hosting Somali people: Hartasheikh A, 
Hartasheikh B, Rabasso, Camaboker, Daror, Teferi Ber, Darwanaje, Kebre Beyah and Aisha 
(plus one camp, Hol Hol, in Djibouti territory). At that time the general population was esti-
mated to be approximately 600,000 – the real number far less. On the issue see Ambroso 2002. 
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2) to provide some insights on the manner in which – in the course of inter-
laced institutional collapse, wars, and international interventions – new 
equilibriums and forms of government have emerged. 
When the study of refugee camps is connected to the broader context where-
in they are located, refugees themselves come into view as actual social ac-
tors (see Allen/Morsink 1994, Allen 1996), thus contradicting the image of 
passivity commonly attached to them.7 The vivacity and resilience of local 
contexts with respect to external and planned interventions – under particu-
lar conditions that I will try to elucidate – remind us not to overvalue the 
concrete effectiveness of the policies of control and discipline carried out by 
both national states and international organisations. With regard to the Afri-
can context, the point has been raised, for instance, by Latham, who calls at-
tention to the limits of external interventions and to their vulnerability: ‘their 
presence affects that local context, but does not order it’ (2001: 86). 
In an attempt to highlight the historical trajectory followed by relief in-
terventions in the area, I will primarily take into account the Ogaden camps, 
established in Somalia as a consequence of the war with Ethiopia. These con-
stitute a sort of prologue to subsequent events: the dynamics involved, 
strongly controlled by the Somali state, were in fact later replicated and 
adapted by non-institutional actors such as rebellion movements and refugees 
themselves. The second and third sections will then deal with the Ethiopian 
camps: from 1988 to 1991 as ‘civil war camps’ and then from 1991 onward as 
‘state collapse camps’. The first two sections are mostly based on the available 
scientific literature and provide a quite schematic description of the events in-
volved. In the third section I analyse more extensively the case of Darwanaje 
Camp, drawing basically upon my own fieldwork and thus restricting my ex-
amination to a limited area. Finally, I will come back to some general remarks 
related to the political legacies and provide some conclusions. 
 
 
A prologue: the Ogaden camps (1978–1988) 
 
The new refugee camps built from 1988 on inside Ethiopia mirrored earlier 
camps on the other side of the border. These original camps were the direct 
result of the 1977/78 war, during which Somalia and Ethiopia had fought 
over the Ogaden territory, a region inhabited by Somalis but actually within 
                                                 
7  Taking such a specific standpoint of course entails passing over other aspects related to 
the topic. While the relationship between aid agencies and refugees has been widely ana-
lysed (cf. Harrel Bond 1992, 1995, 1999, Hyndmann 2000), I would like to stress that my at-
tention to the macro social consequences of relief interventions on the regional scale does 
not imply overlooking the personal suffering and harsh living conditions of those sheltered 
in the camps. For such topics see for instance Declich 2001, Farah N. 2000, Farah Ah.Y. 1996. 
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Ethiopia. North-western Somaliland was deeply involved in this Ogaden 
war (1977-78), being located near the major front line close to the disputed 
towns of Jigjiga and Dire Dawa, and was therefore deeply affected by the 
subsequent refugees’ invasion. The original camps survived until 1990/91, 
when both the Ethiopian and the Somali regimes collapsed. During their 
twelve years of existence, these camps were incorporated within the political 
machine of the Somali state and were, according to Lewis (2002: 247), ‘fro-
zen’. In the aftermath of the military defeat and amidst the consequent politi-
cal and economic crisis, they were transformed into political hostages in the 
government’s struggle to gain funding from international organisations, the 
level of funding being dependent on the number of refugees. The National 
Refugee Council (NRC), a newly established state agency created to tackle 
the refugee emergency, became an immensely powerful bureaucratic body 
and the generator of public and private wealth and of political careers: 
 
Under its extraordinary Commissioner …, the NRC built up an impressive 
empire which viewed demographic enquiry with grave suspicion … 
[within] a refugee relief economy. The actual number of refugees qualifying 
for this support thus soon became a lively issue (Lewis, 2002: 247-48). 
 
The tough disputes over the refugee numbers fought between the Somali 
government on the one hand and UNHCR (United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees) and international donors on the other have become a 
classic example in the special literature on refugee studies. Scholars have 
written extensively on this issue (cf. Harrell-Bond et al. 1992, Kibreab 1993, 
2004, Hyndmann 2000, Zitelmann 1989), reporting on both the negotiations 
between the institutions involved and the practical recounting attempts.8 
As reported by Kibreab (2004), who in a recent article accurately summa-
rises the whole subject, the size of the contribution of humanitarian aid to the 
national economy at that time appears rather impressive and reveals as well 
the magnitude of the crisis which followed the military defeat: 
 
Because the donors complied with the inflated refugee figures, the trade in 
refugee commodities soon became the largest industry in Somalia, increas-
ing the country’s GNP by an estimated 40 per cent in 1980. The relief effort 
also generated an enormous amount of employment and economic activity 
(Tucker 1982: 23, quoted in Kibreab 2004: 4).9 
                                                 
8  Incidentally, it was exactly through such experiences that the Somalis gained the label of 
‘difficult population’ within the developmental and humanitarian world (cf. Kibreab 2003, 
Hyndmann 2000). 
9  The author also emphasises how ‘up to 75 per cent of the relief aid was stolen before 
reaching the refugees in the camps’ and that ‘in spite of the fact that the supply of food was 
abundant (…) many refugee groups were left to starve’ (ib.). 
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Food aid was diverted to the market or for the maintenance of public agen-
cies, namely the army (Ghalib 1995: 147 ff.). What is relevant for the purpose 
of this article is that the implemented mechanism of diversion of aid re-
sources implied the direct involvement and connivance of the refugees and 
the local population. Practically, increasing the statistics meant increasing the 
level of aid brought to the country, particularly in the form of food rations. 
Correspondingly, this meant distributing more ration cards to refugees than 
what was normally due and enlarging family size. Moreover, as a result of 
these political manoeuvres, refugee status and the accompanying ration card 
were also easily attained by existing local groups, and were exchanged lo-
cally. For many neighbouring rural groups (semi-nomadic agro-pastoralists) 
this became part of their livelihood strategy (Djama 1995, Farah 1996b). 
Though such practices were usually linked to camp officials’ strategies for 
controlling the reselling of food aid or its relocation to other unofficial recipi-
ents – thereby tying the refugees within a general patronage and dependency 
system – the whole mechanism somehow became beneficial for the latter 
also. The positive effects for the local economy appeared obvious, and it was 
clear that the crucial point for the function of the overall structure was the 
manipulation of statistics and ration cards. From this, a general consensus to 
hamper any attempt to find out the genuine numbers emerged. Kibreab de-
scribes how such a consensus was produced by the government officials in 
particular, who forged a wide-ranging alliance ‘encompassing all the politi-
cal forces from top to bottom: from the national leadership, regional and dis-
trict authorities, NRC officials to refugees’ (2004: 5 – Zitelmann 1989 provides 
a vivid account of the operation of such a system and its complexity).  
When focusing on the genealogies of humanitarian aid in the region, the 
transformation of a relief intervention into a sort of government enterprise 
invites two kinds of comparison. If compared to the past, this behaviour con-
trasts remarkably with that officially adopted by the same government dur-
ing the 1974/75 drought, which was characterised by an emphasis on the 
idea of national autonomy and promptness in meeting the needs of the 
population (cf. Lewis 1975)10. Such business-like activity11 also contrasts 
deeply with the subsequent transformation of the refugee camps into places 
                                                 
10  Of course, by and large such an emphasis was simply official rhetoric. Furthermore, the 
rescue operations involved political goals as well, namely, the encapsulation of the dis-
placed nomads within projects of sedentarisation and the construction of state cooperatives. 
The issue entails diverse elements, and behind national pride, the USSR was providing sub-
stantial aid; my point is just to mark a difference between the two relief interventions, in a 
process where such interventions became the contested locus for a growing visibility and a 
more demanding interference of international actors, though one variously manipulated by 
local actors. 
11  However, as carefully shown by Kibreab (1993), the external representation of everyday 
life in these camps continuously emphasised an image of passivity attached to refugees. 
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of war and violence, particularly in the north at the end of the 1980s, when 
the favouritism which characterised the distribution of aid resources com-
bined with the lines of political exclusion and division. 
The refugee camps became part of the consensus machine of the central 
government in a second respect also. They were indeed instrumental in re-
formulating the alliance of the regime with the Ogaden clans and in main-
taining these clans’ support of state power after the government’s defeat in 
the war and the retreat of the Somali army, in which such groups had played 
a prominent role. From this point of view, these refugee camps were used 
not only to give protection to the Ogaden population living in Ethiopia and 
exposed to the Ethiopian army’s retaliation, but also to convert some of the 
ex-combatants directly into refugees (Prunier 1997: 394), thus partially solv-
ing the problem of demobilisation. Through humanitarian aid new resources 
were distributed, and their management was largely entrusted to the Ogaden 
elites. The patronage system wherein they were encapsulated saw the partial 
substitution of a public agency, the army, with another, the relief bureauc-
racy within the NRC. This created tensions, particularly in the north. Here 
Ogaden refugees were given job opportunities at the Berbera port or re-
served pastoral areas and water points for the recovery of their pastoral ac-
tivities, thus creating tense competition with the local Isaaq pastoral 
groups12. At the same time, young refugees within the camps were recruited 
by the national army and utilised in the repressive campaign against SNM 
and its supporting clans, chiefly the Isaaq. These factors further fuelled the 
conflict in the north, and throughout the 1980s the camps in this area became 
profoundly involved in the general confrontation, as targets of various at-
tacks by SNM and its supporters (Africa Watch 1990, Gersony 1989). 
 
 
1988–1991: the northern civil war camps 
 
Between 1988 and 1991 the struggle in the north between the SNM and the 
central government escalated into civil war. As the SNM tried to take control 
of the main northern cities, the government reacted with force, bombing the 
main towns (cf. Africa Watch, 1990). As a result, the consequent flight of the 
civil population from the urban centres (Hargeysa, Burco, Gabiley) led to the 
                                                 
12  It is not my intention to ‘ethnicise’ the problem of refugees in the north: surely, for the 
most part, the refugees coming from Ethiopia belonged to the Ogaden clan, though not ex-
clusively, and of course not all the Ogadens were part of the regime’s patronage system or 
benefited from it. The ethnicisation of the problem in the north is partly the result of the 
civil strife and of the modes in which it has been fought. The refugee problem was part of 
this construction, though it also derived from and exploited a long antecedent tradition of 
animosity between the two groups (cf. Markakis 1989, Askar 1992). 
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creation of a series of refugee camps just inside Ethiopia, along the border 
with northern Somalia. 
As the regime utilised the Ogaden camps as bases for the recruitment of 
new soldiers in the civil strife, the SNM attempted the same in the camps in 
Ethiopia, although with a notable difference. While in the Ogaden camps re-
cruitment was forced, in the new camps it was voluntary, though it took 
place within a setting of extreme difficulty. Besides the harsh living condi-
tions, the newly established camps were in fact attentively monitored by Siad 
Barre’s emissaries (Farah 1996), transforming them into a space of tense po-
litical confrontation. Notwithstanding this, the hosted population also pro-
vided economic support to the struggle by handing part of their food rations 
over to the SNM. 
The escalation of the conflict, the heavy repression enforced by the So-
mali army, and the flight of the civil population across the border into Ethio-
pia transformed the fight into a popular rebellion (Compagnon 1992), which 
had its centre in the safe areas just across the Ethiopian border and, conse-
quently, in the refugee camps. The SNM organisational and military struc-
ture was at that time strongly weakened by the government offensive but 
was replaced by a new informal organisation centred on tribal councils led 
by the lineage leaders. It was no longer a military structure led by an external 
leadership, but was rather a structure strictly linked to the territory and more 
clearly organised and directed along tribal lines. Such councils, which later 
became a permanent and institutionalised forum, held a fundamental value 
insofar as they inaugurated a mode of governance that marked the whole of 
the 1990s and became the basis for the foundation of the new political order 
after the fall of the dictatorship. In the process, the long local tradition of in-
formal politics was formalised and finally institutionalised into the Guurti, 
the upper chamber according to the Somaliland Constitution. The evolution of 
the political order drew on experiences which dated back to the colonial era 
(Compagnon 1993: 18-19) and which continued even during the dictatorship 
period, partly induced by Barre’s rule and partly stemming from the auto-
nomous local trajectory of the eldership. The first national tribal leaders’ as-
sembly was actually held in 1988 in a far-off spot along the border, thus con-
firming the effectiveness of the transboundary tactics. 
As a political tool for both the government and the opposition, the two 
initial phases of the refugee camps greatly influenced the following events. 
Such early phases formed a model which shaped the dynamics of the new 
camps. The old camps left a particular heritage which comprised a sort of 
‘collective humanitarian memory’: a complex body of knowledge relating to 
behavioural models of interaction and appropriation of aid assistance, and 
practical examples of how to use it within local dynamics.  
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Previous experiences and memories of humanitarian aid contributed to 
shaping the relationship between the new camps, the locality, and the hu-
manitarian regime under the new conditions of state collapse. 
 
 
1991–2001: the state collapse camps – the case of the Darwanaje 
refugee camp13 
 
After the Siad Barre regime fell in January 1991, fighting continued for sev-
eral weeks between the SNM and local militias within areas which had pre-
viously been government strongholds. This meant the establishment of more 
refugee camps further west (Teferi Ber, Darwanaje, Aisha), at a time of com-
plete institutional collapse and social instability.  
Later, an agreement among the various forces and groups on the 
ground in the whole north-western region of Somalia was reached, thus lay-
ing the foundations for the formation of the new Somaliland state, which de-
clared itself independent from the rest of Somalia in May 1991.14 However, 
such a fragile initial pacification was not enough to effect the return of the 
refugees. On the contrary, a totally novel situation opened up for all of the 
Ethiopian camps along the Somaliland border – the old ones created in 1988 
and the new ones as well. A general setting characterised by precarious 
socio-economic conditions and no immediate expectation of political stability 
marked the subsequent events. The refugee camps remained and, in fact, be-
came much more than a shelter against violence; indeed, they formed a shel-
ter against social collapse. As such, they took on a very peculiar role in the 
history of the newly founded Somaliland. 
a) Capturing humanitarian aid: the formation of the Darwanaje camp 
Darwanaje refugee camp is typical of this new phase. Situated on the border 
between north-eastern Ethiopia and the most western part of Somaliland, the 
camp was created in 1991 and closed only in 2001, following a series of repa-
                                                 
13  This section is based on fieldwork I carried out in Borama town in 2003 and later in 
summer 2005 among the returnees from Darwanaje refugee camp. For this reason I have 
chosen to describe here in detail the economics of humanitarian aid consumption, which in 
many respects replicates the economics of the previous generations of camps. In this sec-
tion, by considering a single case, I also restrict my examination to a particular region of 
Somaliland: the Awdal region. Interviews – single persons and groups – were conducted, 
particularly in the suburb of Xaaslehda: for full details see my PhD thesis ‘Ordine/Dis-
ordine – Politiche della ricomposizione sociale nella regione di Borama, Somaliland, 1993-
2003’ Università di Milano-Bicocca, a.a. 2004-05. 
14  Cf. Lewis 2002 for a description of the events. 
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triation exercises instrumented by UNHCR from 1997 on. It mainly collected 
groups fleeing from the region of Awdal, in particular the town of Borama. 
Initially perceived by the refugees as a form of insurance against uncer-
tainty, Darwanaje later became one of the pillars of the Awdal region’s eco-
nomic recovery. Eventually it would no longer be an emergency camp, but 
rather a camp that blurred with the local social and economic environment. 
At the first sign of this change, the local people established strategies in order 
to capture, in a fashion, the camp by way of manipulation and infiltration 
during the registration process. This produced multiple and exaggerated ra-
tion cards for each family group. After the chaotic flight across the border 
and as Ethiopian authorities started to gather the groups at specific points, it 
was not difficult for both genuine refugees and local people who had quite 
simply ‘joined the queue’ during the registration to take advantage of the ini-
tial confusion and get more than one ration card and/or cards indicating a 
higher number of family members than existed in reality. These practices, 
common to other refugee contexts (cf. Harrell-Bond et al. 1992, Harrell-Bond 
1999)15 and typical of previous local relief experiences, clearly explain why 
the number of refugees in the official statistics, once again, by far exceeded 
the reality.16 In one way, these tactics represented the popular version of the 
Siad Barre political model of refugee camps management, now spontaneous 
and self-managed. The peculiar conjunction provided by institutional col-
lapse on both sides of the border (the end of the Barre regime in January 1991 
was followed by the end of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in May) led to 
the reopening of the border itself, and the whole setting – with regard to the 
relationship of the new camp with the surrounding context – resembled the 
first generation of Somali camps. The open border permitted the reconstitu-
tion of a unique regional area. 
Once again, camp location played an important role in shaping the nature 
of these dynamics. Darwanaje Camp was in fact situated in Ethiopia, just 
across the border from Somalia and only about 15 km from Borama, the capital 
of the Awdal region, where most of the refugees came from. Furthermore, this 
area of Ethiopia and the Borama region are inhabited by Somali groups from 
the same clans. The people on both sides of the border share language and ge-
nealogy, both instrumental in distinguishing personal identity. 
                                                 
15  To be precise, as Kibreab remarks: ‘manipulation of refugee statistics is widely practiced 
by countries of origin, host governments, donor states, humanitarian organizations, and 
refugee population’ (Kibreab 2004: 9).  
16  As a ‘purely’ state collapse camp, Darwanaje – according to Ambroso, who served as 
repatriation officer for UNHCR in Somaliland during those years, cf. Ambroso 2002 – had a 
lower number of genuine refugees compared to the camps that originated during the civil 
strife (30 percent of the total population as opposed to 50 percent for the civil war camps).  
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Economic and social networks linked this peripheral area to Borama 
town.17 Right from the outset, relationships between the camp and the town 
involved an intricate network, established through the earlier processes of ur-
banisation where the links between rural and urban settings had remained un-
broken. In this respect, the camp represented the last stage of the history of the 
frontier region, which has been marked by various strategies for crossing the 
border and taking advantage of it alternated with periods where the border 
was closed and highly patrolled. The practice of smuggling, a fine calculation 
of the reciprocal advantages found on the two sides of the border as well as a 
complex body of local knowledge on how to cross it and take advantage of its 
opportunities, are an integral element of such a history (cf. Djama 1995, Ranger 
1994). The creation of camps during the ongoing flight incorporated these net-
works, and camps were clearly distinguishable on a tribal basis.  
Thus, Darwanaje, like Teferi Ber/Aw Barre, became a Gadabursi camp.18 
Local patterns of social organisation, more meaningful and influential, over-
lapped and intertwined with the organisation of the humanitarian regime 
and helped to determine internal camp dynamics. An additional element to 
consider is the practice of semi-nomadism associated with agro-pastoral ac-
tivities, common to this area around Borama, mobility being a further com-
plicating factor faced by outside relief agencies in the classification of local 
social groups. 
Location, memories, and situation affected once more the real shape of 
the camp and transformed its raison d’être: from emergency camp to shelter 
against political and social collapse, and deeply embedded in social networks 
connecting the camp to its surroundings. 
 
b) Distribution and redistribution of relief items 
 
As scholars have widely documented (Allen 1996, Christensen 1986, Harrell-
Bond/Voutira 1995, Kibreab 1993, 2004, Piguet 1998), the development of a 
parallel market alongside the ‘official distribution’, in which the goods deliv-
ered by the relief agencies are resold and turned into something else, is a 
common phenomenon in refugee camp situations. 
This is the product first of several general factors: the inadequacy of the 
food ration to meet the whole spectrum of the basic needs; the concentration 
of a given number of people in the same place (in 1994 the camp hosted ap-
proximately 40,000 people – the initial number of officially registered refu-
gees was around 115,000: Ambroso, 2002), a fact that in itself attracted the lo-
                                                 
17  As well as to the Ethiopian side of the border, particularly the town of Jigjiga, where the 
UNHCR officials were established – cf. Farah Ah.Y. 1996b. 
18  Gadabursi being the major descent group in the Awdal region. On the contrary, the civil 
war camps were mainly populated with Isaaq. 
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cal traders; and the heavy impact of the humanitarian machine on the local 
situation in terms of the quantity of resources displayed. 
In Darwanaje further specific factors added to this: the surplus of food 
rations delivered, because of the manipulation of refugee numbers; the pre-
existing social networks linking the refugees and the people living in the area 
adjacent to the camp, and the proximity of their place of origin; the historical 
background characterised by uncertainty and negative expectations; a sort of 
know-how on how to interact with international agencies based on past ex-
periences; and poor control on the part of the Ethiopian state over the cross-
ing of the boundary and entry to the camp. Under these conditions, the par-
allel economy of reselling, recycling and transforming, carried out directly by 
the refugees, became the central feature of Darwanaje life.  
As a result, the camp and Borama town became part of a unique economic 
system. The working relationship between humanitarian aid and local dynam-
ics, through a sort of multiplier effect, produced several consequences, on the 
economic level as well as the social and political levels, as will be shown. 
In the informal refugee economic activity, goods delivered by aid assis-
tance were considered by the refugees as a resource and not simply the fin-
ished article ready to be used. Within the dynamics of everyday life, both 
within the camp and outside it, goods received took on a different purpose 
and began to circulate in ways that were not intended by the donors. Goods 
were adapted and utilised according to local needs. Furthermore, they took 
on a different significance. This applied firstly to refugee status recognition. 
To get more than one card and to exaggerate the number of family members 
was in fact the first way to appropriate the aid. 
The second mode of appropriation was the resale of food. This was to 
become the main resource. The major exchange networks were all organised 
around it. Food resale became a very specialised activity. It involved small 
and poor families that resold a part of their ration in order to get other pri-
mary needs (such as clothes, or food not included in the basic ration), but it 
also involved those utilising a strategy of accumulation with a view to the 
investment of any profit into new small trading activities as well as the ‘pro-
fessional’ wholesalers operating in regional food markets outside the camp. 
The latter were usually backed by commercial networks led by people from 
Borama or Ethiopia. 
Even secondary elements of the aid machine were recycled, for instance 
packaging materials: the bags were sewn together to become roofing material 
for the huts and were sold in the market. Later on, building on this first-
phase income, new work activities could be started: for example, small shops 
selling clothes, shoes, tea, and kat were opened. Town traders, attracted by 
the new opportunities, also established their shops on the edges of the camp. 
As business increased, more new activities appeared, including small restau-
rants and hotels. The humanitarian organisations working in the camp also 
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provided opportunities for new businesses, offering jobs within the struc-
tures they were building, such as schools or health centres, or during the dis-
tribution process.  
When it became clear that the camp was becoming a business centre, re-
sources from outside began to appear as well: loans procured by the kinship 
group or by newly established local business networks as well as income re-
ceived from relatives outside the camp or even from those working abroad. 
Horst (2006) has emphasised how the refugee camp is only one of the places 
in which the kinship group is located, within a framework of continuous co-
operation and exchange. According to the author, the years following the fall 
of the Barre regime saw a real boom of Somali companies specialising in 
money transfers. While Horst describes such expansion in the south, refer-
ring to the refugee camps located in northern Kenya, the same can be said for 
northern Somalia: it was there that today’s largest money transfer and tele-
phone company made its first transactions in the Ethiopian refugee camps 
(personal information; cf. also Marchal 1996). The dislocation of the families 
in the camps or abroad, which has constituted the primary forced strategy 
adopted by the Somalis in the face of state collapse, goes together with the 
need to maintain links and contacts. 
In addition, the resettlement programmes set up by UNHCR, as well as 
the self-managed migration projects carried out by the refugees on the 
grounds of the status accorded to them by UNHCR, have further multiplied 
the creation of a Somali diaspora across the world (cf. Farah, 2000). 
c) Local space reorganisation and social networks 
Through all the above activities a complete transformation of the nature of 
the camp occurred. The new shops, the circulation of goods, the movement 
of people, can be viewed as contributing factors in the socialisation of the 
place, replacing the artificial establishment of the camp in an area which was 
previously a small Ethiopian military camp controlling the boundary. In fact, 
it became much like a Somali town or, indeed, actually became one. It was 
essentially a big market and – as it was reported to me – a booming area ca-
pable of attracting people and investment from Borama town, making it a fo-
cus for the economic recovery of the whole region.19 
The camp, at the beginning a sort of foreign body with respect to the re-
gion, became an integral part of the local dynamics in a very short time. Be-
cause of the camp’s linguistic and genealogical proximity to the local commu-
nity and the social networks linking it to neighbouring areas and the town, lo-
                                                 
19  Material proof of this was given by the wide distribution of wheat grains – a typical 
food aid item, since local and imported staples are normally sorghum, wheat flour, or rice – 
in regional markets (both Somaliland and Ethiopia): cf. Farah Ah.Y. 1996b.  
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cal people forced it to be an active open space. It became an important centre 
for the agro-pastoral groups living around it, but most of all it formed a direct 
link with the town of Borama. Communication with the city, previously taking 
the form of a track used by the local pastoral people, became intense, with cars 
and trucks coming and going everyday, so much so that in Borama someone 
started to call the new road the ‘Highway Darwanaje’.20  
The crucial point in the appropriation of humanitarian aid has been its 
transfer from the humanitarian framework to local informal networks. What 
has typically followed was that the local ‘humanitarian entrepreneurs’ acti-
vated already existing social networks in which transactions and exchanges 
were based on a set of familiar, tribal, and friendship types of relationships. 
Thus, the appropriation of humanitarian aid was immediately accompanied 
by reinvestment and redistribution. Through this networking activity, peo-
ple, resources, and goods were linked. As such, they could circulate within 
local social spheres characterised by specific behavioural codes well known 
to everybody, more suitable to the social environment, and within which 
people were much more confident than in the more formal exchanges with 
aid agencies. Often described as fraud, cheating, illegal acts, or marginal 
phenomena to be deterred, these practices were, from a local point of view, 
precisely what made the aid really effective. It is precisely the connection be-
tween aid and local networks and circuits that made the Darwanaje camp 
pivotal to everyday life in Borama throughout the 1990s.21 
 
d) Social production 
 
Using de Certeau’s definition of consumption (1980), we can call this appro-
priation activity ‘the local consumption of humanitarian aid’. De Certeau de-
fines consumption as an astute and widespread activity, which gets every-
where, silent and almost unnoticed, and whose actions are not characterised 
by ‘taking initiative’ but rather by ‘ways of using’ the products created by the 
dominant economic order. De Certeau uses this idea in order to describe the 
practices of the common man within a social environment dominated by an 
‘instrumental rationality’. This would suggest a similarity with a refugee camp 
situation, given that the means of the humanitarian organisation are charac-
                                                 
20  Whereas I describe here the unique relationship between Darwanaje and Borama town, 
the same dynamics can be described for the other camps, in particular Hartasheikh. Within 
a short time it became the business centre for the Hargeisa region, very much connected 
with the capital Hargeisa on the Somaliland side and Jigjiga on the Ethiopian one. Similar 
developments were also recorded in northern Kenya, cf. Montclos et al. 2000. 
21  And it is the representation that disconnects the camp from the surrounding social envi-
ronment which makes such labels plausible and current. The rhetoric of the dependency 
syndrome (Kibreab 1993) is always ready to step in as soon as such a disconnection occurs. 
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terised by an action of ‘instrumental rationality’: the need to acquire informa-
tion, to count, and to plan in order to deliver the goods. The refugees’ answers 
and actions typically reflect such a system: to obscure deliberately (the counting, 
the inquiries about family composition, etc.), to manipulate (the official defi-
nitions, the goods delivered, the labels attached to them), and to gain access 
(within the humanitarian machine in order to take advantage). The relation-
ship is marked by conflict and mistrust: refugees’ consumption appears like 
a siege, a battle, subversion, and clashes with the humanitarian institution’s 
wish for absolute control.22 Such a production of mistrust, and the tense rela-
tionship which actually constitutes a typical trait of aid dynamics in the re-
gion, is one of the effects of the peculiar bond built up between external aid 
and local dynamics over time. 
The consumption of humanitarian aid, however, as I mentioned, entails 
many more levels and differentiations than the simple local/external divide. 
Farah (1996) clearly described the various hierarchies existing within the Te-
feri Ber camp, located approximately 30 km east of Darwanaje, and showed 
how the distribution of items was internally regulated according to local 
rules rather than the formal procedures of aid organisations. 
Additionally, another part of such hierarchies appears particularly evident 
when the broader camp-town system and the strategies utilised by the refu-
gees to leave the camp are taken into account. Such dynamics clearly illus-
trate the transformations in the territory and social relationships that first the 
dislocation and later the relief intervention induce. 
As I stressed earlier, the strategies of the local populace produced the 
development of an integral town-camp system. This not only involved eco-
nomic exchanges and the redistribution of relief items outside the camps but 
also conveyed a social dimension in a broader sense. Such an aspect was 
marked by two distinct features. First, what might be described as ‘task shar-
ing’: in correspondence with the political agreement with SNM and the 
Somaliland declaration of independence in May 1991, people in a good eco-
nomic and political position were the first to return to town, partly to defend 
their possessions but also to play a role in the peace-making process and 
work on the construction of a new order. At the same time, those less fa-
voured continued to ‘invest’ in the camp, meanwhile maintaining relation-
ships – based, for instance, on kinship ties (and implying both solidarity and 
hierarchy) – with the town and its occupants.  
The second feature displays a strategy of interdependence. It might mean, 
for example, an individual deciding to leave his family in the camp and to find 
                                                 
22  Also in this case, UNHCR recounting exercises, conducted in collaboration with the 
Ethiopian army, have taken on the role of symbolising such confrontations. On this point 
see the descriptions given by Ambroso 2002. 
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a job outside, either in town or elsewhere; to leave the weakest members of the 
family in the camp; or to stay in the camp only in more difficult times.  
When UNHCR started repatriation exercises in 1996/97, many people 
had thus already left the camp, either definitively or by playing the interde-
pendence tactic. Those who remained until the last period were really the 
worst off, in terms of economic resources as well as contacts and social rela-
tionships which could have given them support. This was the case, for in-
stance, of a family originally from a small village located further west of Bo-
rama, close to the border with Djibouti. The solution they deployed, after 
UNHCR had quite literally pushed them out of the camp, was to ‘occupy’ a 
plot of land in Borama which belonged to a rich clansman, whom, however, 
they did not know directly. They subsequently went to him and, trying to 
mobilise the kinship connection and claiming that the respective forefathers 
knew each other, asked for permission to stay there. The result of such an in-
trusive practice was that the rich man included the family within his per-
sonal network of clients and offered them some jobs in the various busi-
nesses he had in town. This was possible because he had the means to take 
advantage of this self-inclusion, enlarging his social ties and strengthening 
his position within the lineage by showing that he could fulfil the duty of 
solidarity and mutual help. In other cases, regarding less wealthy groups, 
such invasive strategies produced tensions within the extended family or the 
lineage. The manner in which the survival strategies of those in the lower 
levels of the societymatched the larger social circuits, particularly clan and 
lineages, was thus extremely complex. Social networks were crossed by op-
posite drives, either towards a reformulation of internal hierarchies, produc-
ing broader social cleavages, or toward an emphasis on internal cooperation, 
though on the narrower basis of extended family or neighbourhood relation-
ships. Groups and modes of social interaction were redesigned in this way. 
Claims of mutual collaboration and solidarity could hide non-symmetrical 
relations and social distance; collaboration often stemmed from intrusion tac-
tics or strategies of co-optation rather than from reciprocity. 
A final effect of the strict integration of the camps and the urban centres – 
referring not only to the link between Darwanaje and Borama, but also to 
other cases such as Hartasheikh and Hargeisa – has been the move to town 
after the camps were progressively closed. The example mentioned above 
also corresponds to an urbanisation process. Like the family in the case just 
described, a great number of people who lived in rural areas or in small vil-
lages before being displaced went to the big regional centres upon the clo-
sure of the camps. Towns were in fact perceived as safer places to move to, 
where it could also be easier to restart a living and find opportunities. There 
are no statistics to illustrate such a phenomenon, but many case studies col-
lected during the fieldwork in the new Borama suburbs strongly substantiate 
the relevance of this process. The move to town from the camps was accom-
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panied by similar migration from the countryside and returns from abroad. 
These two moves are still continuing, and urbanisation now represents a ma-
jor phenomenon in Somaliland, itself conveying different changes. Undoubt-
edly, refugee camps contributed significantly to such a dynamics.  
While in the early 1990s the refugee camps were the receiving centre for 
remittances from abroad, later the major towns started to play this role. The 
continuous flow of money from the Diaspora has actually constituted a huge 
source of support for the revival of the urban centres and their massive 
growth (cf. Ahmed, 2000). But what I would like to highlight once again is 
the deep interconnection between the camps’ experience and subsequent so-
cial dynamics: the camps fuelled the dispersal of the Somalilanders into dif-
ferent communities scattered across the world, and they were also the place 
where big money transfer or communications companies were born. More-
over, the same extensive entrepreneurial spirit which emerged in the camps 
now characterises the urban landscape (cf. Marchal, 1996). 
 
 
Political legacies 
 
The previous example stresses once again the specific contribution of the 
camps to local social dynamics, as part of the 1990s local social history. Mov-
ing across the various facets of aid appropriation, I will now briefly draw at-
tention to its upper levels and the institutions built up locally in order to 
manage the relief intervention. The significance of such an aspect has to be 
examined while considering the whole line of refugee camps placed along 
the border. As in the past, for the new Somaliland state, the refugee issue be-
came, in fact, a national one. 
As was the case with the Ogaden camps, where the administrative insti-
tution for refugee affairs (NRC) became a powerful bureaucratic body within 
the Somali state, in the new Somaliland government the related ministry, the 
Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MRRR), ac-
quired a similar centrality. It was actually the only ministry that did not 
change its guidance during the first years of the new Somaliland state, and it 
was the primary interlocutor with international actors when the camps’ 
management in Ethiopia started to plan, in 1994, a repatriation programme. 
It operated in close conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Planning. The three ministries, popularly known as ‘the line’, 
represented the bulk of the state in the early 1990s – together with the Minis-
try of Finance, which controlled the revenues from the Berbera port – insofar 
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as they were collecting and managing most of the financial resources.23 They 
were actually the sole offices provided with full budget capacity. It was pre-
cisely the interface with external organisations that conferred on them such a 
position.24 The relationship served as a foundation in a double sense: the re-
sources obtained through humanitarian aid (for instance, in terms of refugee 
repatriation projects, infrastructure such as building or vehicles) constituted 
for the government one of the few material tools available in a context of 
general international isolation and lack of recognition. At the same time, as a 
symbolic resource, this same interface provided legitimacy and a kind of in-
formal recognition to the new political subject vis-à-vis international organi-
sations and neighbouring countries, in particular Ethiopia. Even now the 
three ministries are located in the same compound, thus also signalling spa-
tially the integrated functions of the exterior-oriented institutions.  
Such a trajectory of course leaves a legacy and constructs one of the core 
dynamics of the new state institutions, reproducing the model of extraver-
sion typical, as elsewhere, of the former Somali experience. An emphasis on 
‘institution building’ has accompanied the entire collaboration of external 
organisations with local Somaliland institutions. This means the develop-
ment of a class of aid workers and bureaucrats situated at the interface be-
tween the state and international agencies who can cultivate a typical ethos 
related to the public realm and an expertise concerning administration, bu-
reaucracy, or technical matters. In other cases such an expertise drifts to-
wards practices where the consumption tactics and mistrust typical of refu-
gee camps interactions are reproduced. At the interface between the diverse 
elements which constitute the new public realm, the dynamics of manipula-
tion and appropriation appear in fact as a typical feature. This recalls the no-
tion of métis evoked by Bayart in order to describe a sort of ‘structure of in-
teraction’, a type of relationship with external actors widespread on the con-
temporary African social and political scene. Métis is distinctive to relation-
ships based on a certain degree of power disparity as well as cultural dis-
tance, and it is associated with social situations involving intermediaries and 
activities of mediation. In such a fashion, it covers, for instance, the ‘net-
                                                 
23  The main resource was actually represented by the port of Berbera and its custom reve-
nues drawn from the export trade, particularly the livestock exports to Saudi Arabia. It was 
President Ciigal, elected during the 1993 Borama conference, who was able to assure such a 
flow of resources (cf. Lewis 2002), thus stabilising the new political entity.  
24  This representation partly contrasts, though it does not contradict, the common view of 
Somaliland as a ‘self-made state’ which could count exclusively on its own resources. This 
is true, and to a certain extent this entrenchment with aid resources represents a meagre 
substitution for official loans accorded by international institutions and not available to a 
non-recognised country; however, in order to depict a kind of genealogy of the new public 
realm in Somaliland, composed of various actors standing beside the state (cf. Ciabarri, in 
Bellagamba & Klute, forthcoming), it is important to include such a trajectory. 
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works of influence and clientelism which constitute the post-colonial state’ 
(Bayart et al. 1999: 47). What is interesting about métis from my perspective is 
its all-encompassing feature – it involves, at the same time, state institutions 
and bureaucrats, middlemen who trade food items, and simple refugees – 
since it resembles the connivance built up in the Ogaden camps between 
Somali officials and refugees.25 My point, however, is not to merge different 
behaviours attached to very different social actors: métis practices are very 
different from one another, and each level of aid consumption implies a large 
degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, such resonances linking the top and bot-
tom of the society are likely to express a kind of ‘structure of consensus’ by 
which the elites may try, at times, to acquire legitimacy or to justify self-
conducted practices of mismanagement of public resources to the general popu-
lation. The relationship between power and population is not only determined 
by a hierarchical system, but also by a kind of intimacy (Herzfeld 1997). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
What I have tried to do is to show the different ways in which, through hu-
manitarian aid, a specific social space, economic circuits, and social relations 
have been produced. This production has been made possible by means of 
the localisation of external intervention, transforming aid into a local fact of 
life. Thus, as an example, for the Awdal region, and particularly for Borama 
town, the Darwanaje camp represented a pivotal element in its social history 
in the 1990s. Only by including such an element is it possible to understand 
how the population has successfully tackled the novel condition of state col-
lapse and managed to restart their lives. The progressive transformation of 
the Ethiopian camps, which made them very much resemble a town and a 
big market, corresponded to an equal transformation outside the camps, 
within Somaliland. As noted, the traumatic experience of displacement and 
regrouping set in motion a complex process of transformation of the society, 
with far-reaching consequences. 
It is now possible to briefly summarise such consequences. Humanitar-
ian aid had first of all an economic impact, becoming the major constitutive 
factor for local markets, as the wide distribution of food aid grains demon-
strates (this also involved a change in the nutrition regime, making the rural 
population in particular more dependent on imported foodstuff). Moreover, 
it revitalised the urban markets and led to the establishment of connections 
                                                 
25  To be clear: métis does not necessarily mean trickery or corruption but rather the need 
for local actors to find a way around the rules in interactions with external actors or the im-
possibility of telling the whole truth as far as the goals and methods of project implementa-
tion are concerned. 
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with regional as well as international markets. This involved all levels of 
business, from petty traders to actors operating in international markets, and 
interested traditional actors as well as new ones. A new entrepreneurial ‘ac-
tivism’ was developed, which still constitutes a distinctive aspect of urban 
life today. Big companies specialising in money transfer and telecommunica-
tions also made their start within the camps. In sum, the general effect was 
the restarting of the local economy and a contribution to the social stabilisa-
tion of the region. 
On the social level, however, the change also entailed a push for the 
huge urbanisation process which followed, as well as an active role for the 
camps in fuelling the migration abroad, a process which is still in motion. 
The local consumption of humanitarian aid permitted this set of unintended 
transformations. The major focus of this article was thus the dynamics of 
such a makeover and the main activities involved, first of all the resale of 
food. From this activity, as a sort of multiplier effect, further developments 
and reinvestments could emerge. 
In part, the new dynamics could rely on past experiences and local memo-
ries related to relief operations. Amidst the differences, I have tried to highlight 
the continuities that characterised the various generations of camps which fol-
lowed one another over time, starting from the Ogaden camps located within 
Somali territory. Only such continuities can explain the specific strength and 
complexity of the entwinement of local contexts and humanitarian aid.  
The original situation, however, has also produced new processes: from 
a broad perspective, under state collapse the external intervention also ac-
companied the reconstitution of state structures. In such a way, the repatria-
tion projects have represented a partial though important constituent of the 
new Somaliland state, both in a material sense and in terms of the reproduc-
tion of a structure of interaction typical of the camps experience. 
The intermingling with international actors, however, has gone even 
further, and such dynamics testify also to a new kind of state building, where 
some of the state’s traditional prerogatives and functions are openly taken 
over by international organisations. Following a path which started with the 
repatriation programmes and the rehabilitation of state structures, such a 
handing over of state functions is now continuing in sectors such as health 
and education (cf. Brons 2001) or in projects which range from capacity 
building to enhancing the awareness of human rights. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Flüchtlingslager sind nicht nur Orte, wo vorübergehender Schutz und erste hu-
manitäre Hilfe angeboten werden, sondern auch Orte, an denen politische und 
soziale Produktion stattfindet. In Regionen wie dem Horn von Afrika mit einer 
langen Tradition an internationalen Interventionen in Form von humanitärer Hil-
fe waren Flüchtlingslager untrennbar eingebettet in lokale und soziale politische 
Machtstrukturen und Dynamiken, die sowohl ihre Ziele als auch ihre Aktionen 
transformierten. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, solche Transformationen unter 
Berücksichtigung der besonderen Bedingungen des Staatszerfalls als Teil einer 
lokalen sozialen Geschichte zu analysieren, der Somaliland in den frühen 1990ern 
kennzeichnete. Des Weiteren möchte ich zeigen, wie in der Verflechtung von in-
stitutionellem Verfall, Kriegen und internationalen Interventionen neue Gleich-
gewichte und Regierungsformen entstanden, die eine Art Genealogie des neuen 
öffentlichen Bereichs darstellen, der sich aus verschiedenen Akteuren, die neben 
dem Staat bestehen, zusammensetzt. 
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Résumé 
 
Les camps de réfugiés ne sont pas seulement des lieux qui offrent une protection 
temporaire et une première aide humanitaire, mais également des lieux où prend 
place une production sociale et politique. Dans les régions comme celle de la 
corne de l’Afrique qui ont une longue tradition d’interventions internationales 
sous forme d’aide humanitaire, les camps de réfugiés ont toujours été intrinsé-
quement partie prenante dans les structures et dynamiques locales du pouvoir 
socio-politique qui ont profondément transformé leurs buts et leurs actions. Dans 
cet article, l’objectif est d’analyser ces transformations comme une partie de 
l’histoire sociale locale en prenant particulièrement en compte le contexte de dé-
labrement de l’Etat qui caractérise le Somaliland au début des années 1990. En 
outre, je souhaiterais essayer de montrer comment, dans l’entrelacs du délitement 
institutionnel, des guerres et des interventions internationales, de nouveaux équi-
libres et de nouvelles formes de gouvernement ont émergé. Cet article veut con-
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tribuer ainsi à une sorte de généalogie du nouveau domaine public du Somali-
land auquel participent à côté de l’Etat, de nombreux acteurs. 
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Somaliland 
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